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Abstract. 
  
The commercial fish stock of Utila, Honduras, appears to be in danger of acute decline.  In order to 
establish the perceived scale of decline, identify perceptions of its causes and potential remedies, and 
views on past, present and future management strategies, this paper employed a discourse analysis of 
interview transcripts from primary and key stakeholders.  This illustrated that most stakeholders 
recognised the decline but felt powerless to take the necessary steps to reverse it. The Utilian market-
oriented mode of fisheries governance was perceived to have exacerbated the decline, and 
subsequently, it appeared that two modes of fisheries governance were implicitly endorsed: (1) 
voluntary authoritarianism; and (2) community co management.  This paper concludes that voluntary 
authoritarianism is more likely to succeed in curbing the unprecedented Utilian commercial fish stock 
decline in the short term, in preparation for community co management, a more permanent and 
sustainable solution.  Based on the above, the paper advises caution with regards to allowing market 
forces to determine how fisheries are governed, and emphasises the need for enforcing strict 
regulations on fisheries before contemplating a transition to a more participative mode of fisheries 
governance.  
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1. Introduction 1  
 
With a population of approximately 8,000, the island of Utila lies 29 km off mainland Honduras, in the 
department of Islas De Bahia.  When the first migrants came to the area from the Cayman Islands in the 
1830s, they settled on two cays, situated south west of the main island, 4 km from Utila Town, known 
now as Suc Suc and Pigeon Cay (Figure 1), where agriculture was the mainstay of the economy.   
 
Descendants of these settlers are locally acknowledged as White Cayans.  In the early 1900s, some of 
these White Cayans moved to the main island, and built houses, schools and businesses.  Descendants 
of this group are known as White Utilians, and generally regard themselves as more developed than the 
White Cayans.   
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
In the 1970s, Mestizo Latinos from the Honduran mainland migrated to the islands.  Finally, during the 
last few years, another traditional fishing group from Corisal on mainland Honduras began to appear in 
                                                 
1
 Much of the information in this section is based on interviews with key informants and fishers. 
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the Cays, known as ‘Garifuna’.  Fishing replaced coconut farming as the staple source of income in the 
mid 1960s, and fishing remains the mainstay economic activity in the Cays.  However, the arrival of 
the tourist industry during the last 20 years has transformed Utila town from a fishing community into a 
tourist destination, with hotels, diving and other recreational enterprises, and public services.  By 
contrast, there is little tourism and poor public service provision in the Cays. 
 
The two main communities in Utila; Utila Town and Suc Suc together with Pigeon Cay, (Figure 1) 
were selected as study sites in order to encompass the wide range of demographic and socio economic 
conditions found in the area [1].  The economy of Utila Town is today largely based on dive tourism, 
and its associated ‘spin-off’ businesses, and the majority of resident white Utilian fishers have 
gradually become involved in this industry [2].  In contrast, a lack of alternative livelihoods and pride 
in their fishing heritage finds the majority of men from Suc Suc and Pigeon Cay still heavily reliant on 
fishing [3].  The White Utilians, resident to Utila town, enjoy the highest socio economic position on 
the island out of the four fisher demographic groups.  Within the Suc Suc and Pigeon Cay community, 
the White Cayans are more economically and socially prosperous than the Latinos, while the Garifunas 
occupy the lowest level of the social strata, perceived almost as an underclass.  
 
Pressure on the commercial fisheries around the island increased mainly as a result of immigration 
from mainland Honduras and dive tourism from North America and Europe [4], leading to a state of 
‘Malthusian’ overfishing, a condition associated with poverty and coastal crowding [5][6].  Several fish 
species, including certain grouper [serranidae] and snapper [Lutjanus], are thought to be in danger of 
sequential commercial extinction, and it is possible that poorly managed development and fishing 
practices will contribute to a total algal phase shift within the surrounding coral [7][8].  The only 
significant attempt to protect the marine environment in Utila was the establishment of a marine 
reserve at Turtle Harbour in 1992, predominantly designed to prevent turtle hunting in order to allow 
tourists to observe them, and also to prevent fishing within the area, thereby hoping to curb the decline 
in commercial fish stocks.  
 
The increasingly visible signs of environmental degradation around Utila led to an extension of the Bay 
Islands Conservation Association (BICA) from Roatan to Utila.  BICA is an environmental non 
governmental organisation (ENGO) that obtained legal status from the Honduran government to carry 
out activities for sustainable development alongside the municipalities of the islands.  In Utila, it 
operates as a semi autonomous sub group, and its projects include marine reserve management and 
environmental education.  Together with the influential Dive Association (DA), it recently proposed 
the establishment of a network of no take zones (NTZs) around the island, to prevent fishing in 
spawning areas.  In addition, there are other ENGOs operating in Utila with environmental monitoring 
roles.  The municipality itself exercises authority devolved from the Roatan Municipality, through an 
elected Mayor.  The Mayor at the time of this study was a dive shop owner in Utila town, who gave 
responsibility to BICA for running the Turtle Harbour marine reserve.  However, BICA, DA, the 
municipality and the other ENGOs are perceived by stakeholders to be ineffective in either reversing 
the marine environmental decline or safeguarding socio economic livelihoods, and to have failed to 
effectively involve fishers in management decisions. 
 
 This study aimed to illustrate the most sustainable governance mechanisms to allow for effective, 
efficient and sustainable future fisheries management strategies. The objectives were to achieve this 
aim through examining primary and key stakeholders’ perceptions of the decline in target fish stocks 
through a discourse analysis of interview strategies, examining past, present and future management 
strategies.  Section 2, outlines the theoretical framework, which encompasses discourse analysis and 
governance theory.  Section 3 explains the methodology utilised, and in Section 4, the results of the 
interview analysis of perceptions about the fisheries crisis in Utila are outlined.  Section 5 is a 
discussion of those results, demonstrating evidence of a deep seated malaise and a lack of 
communication between stakeholder groups involved in the Utilian fisheries.  Finally, Section 6 
concludes with a summary of our findings in reference to Utila’s future mode of fisheries governance.  
 
2.  Theoretical framework  
 
2.1 Discourse analysis 
 
A discourse is a shared perception about the world, presented in words, which enable people to make 
sense of information [9].  Consequently, discourses are narratives, which give meaning to ‘facts’ that 
3 
would otherwise remain unstructured data.  Moreover, the discourses that people embrace reveal their 
identities; who they are, and what their core values tend to be.  Discourse analysis also studies the part 
played by conflict and antagonism forged in the process of social interaction [10].  For instance, people 
construct narratives of the ‘other’ as impediments to their own identity.  These narratives are often 
thinly disguised moves in power struggles, designed to bring about, or prevent, shifts in policy or 
governmental structure [11]. The under-used discourse analysis tool is advocated by this paper, as a 
useful tool to explore sub-plots in complex fisheries management situations, such as those identified as 
the case in Utila, Honduras, facilitating more effective management strategies, on a case-by-case basis, 
that are fully amenable to the area in question.  Discourse analysis of the transcripts of interviews with 
Utilians was used to gauge the significance of the interviewees’ different perspectives on the six issues 
of: the seriousness of the fisheries decline (Section 4.1); the cause(s) of the decline (4.2); the failure of 
previous attempts to deal with the decline (4.3); the measures needed in the future to resolve the decline 
(4.4); the appropriateness of the structure of fisheries management for handling the decline (4.5); and 
relations between stakeholders in connection with the decline (4.6).   
 
2.2 Governance theory 
 
 In recent fisheries management literature, three modes of governance have become common place:  
hierarchical; market; and participative [12].  Hierarchical governance is the most common mechanism 
by which fisheries management is implemented.  It is top down, coercive, state centric administration, 
characterised by centralisation, bureaucracy, scientific elitism, and sense of public responsibility.  
Market governance is underpinned by the forces of supply and demand, reflecting the assumption that 
the unimpeded pursuit of rational self interest by independent individuals will maximise the economic 
return from natural resources.  Participative governance is the involvement of stakeholders in fisheries 
management decision making, which entails a spirit of compromise: “the characteristic style of the 
participatory mode is one of consensus seeking negotiation, rather than either the hierarchical style of 
command, or the market style of exchange” [13].  As shall be discussed, Utilian fisheries management 
has been largely market oriented, with some elements of hierarchical governance, but with little 
stakeholder participation.  However, in the interviewees’ narratives, we found high levels of 
dissatisfaction with the current mode of governance, and two implicit alternative paths: voluntary 
authoritarianism (a form of hierarchicalism), whereby coercion is accepted as the price to be paid for 
the recovery of the fish stocks [14]; and community co management (a form of participation), whereby 
fishers themselves take responsibility for self restraint [15].   
 
Voluntary authoritarianism is the establishment by free, individual, unanimous, voluntary consent 
given by all stakeholders, to a strong, single, governmental authority, invested with effective power to 
enforce severe and permanent restrictions on fishing, without fear or favour.  Thomas Hobbes [14], 
prescribed such a ‘Leviathan’ or absolute sovereign body founded on a contract entered into by the 
people, as a means to end civil wars.  Hobbes [14] believed that rational people would prefer to live 
under an absolute ruler rather than to exist in a condition of anarchy, which he portrayed as “solitary, 
nasty, brutish, and short”.  Under the absolute sovereign, all subjects would enjoy security, because the 
ruler would be strong enough to enforce the law on everyone.  Adoption of a Leviathan regime with 
power over fisheries management would mean that strict regulations would be enforced with such 
severity that it would end destructive fishing.  The main reason why such a regime would work is 
because it has been given absolute authority by the populace: they have legitimised it [14].  Moreover, 
the sovereign’s authority only lasts as long as he continues to provide his subjects with the security for 
which they contracted to obey him.  “The obligation of subjects to the Sovereign is understood to last 
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them” [14].  In the case of 
fisheries management, this means that the sovereign body has to ensure that mitigation measures are in 
place to safeguard the economic security of displaced fishers, otherwise their obligation to comply with 
the rules lapses.  This in turn entails that it must possess comprehensive and detailed knowledge of the 
heterogeneous nature of fishers’ groups and their socio economic and cultural differences.  
 
By contrast, community co management is based on a participative culture and a strong moral 
consensus among stakeholders concerning the management of their fisheries.  This culture and 
consensus is firmly institutionalised in a partnership between the government and the fishing industry 
[15].  The main difference between voluntary authoritarianism and community co management is that 
they approach the problem of fisheries decline from opposite perspectives. Voluntary authoritarianism 
addresses the crisis directly, by imposing top down severe measures to protect the fisheries stocks, as a 
result of which the competitiveness between fishers and social divisions between groups would be kept 
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in check.  Where as, community co management addresses the fisheries crisis indirectly, by changing 
the mindset or moral sense of the community so that it can consensually agree to the measures required, 
rather than have them forced upon it from the top down.  However, Jentoft [15] recognises that co 
management is not a quick fix.  Indeed, where “communities are…characterised by social fissures, 
conflicts, inequities, and power differentials…Co management may well entrench such qualities” [15].  
Accordingly, divided societies need a period of preparation during which they can build up their social 
capital – not least by fostering the elements of cooperativeness and environmental stewardship that 
already exist.   
 
3.  Methodology 
 
3. 1 Data collection techniques  
 
Our main form of data collection was in the form of semi structured and open ended interviews with 
both fishers and key informants.  A scoping study was conducted with fishers in the mainland town of 
La Ceiba, to trial the design of potential questions and interview technique [16].  In Utila, ten key 
informants (fish factory owners (FF), Dive Association (DA) members, marine resource managers 
(BICA), representatives of local ENGOs and local government (Mayor and municipality environmental 
officer); in addition to 59 primary stakeholders (artisanal fishers of the four demographic groups), were 
identified, using ‘convenience’ and ‘snowball’ sampling methods [17].  Interviewee sampling was 
based on a systematic design [18].  An independent key informant constructed a map of fishers’ 
households for each of the targeted communities, and every second household was visited, within 
which all fishers were interviewed in the presence of an unbiased mediator and interpreter (a local 
priest with no connections to the fishery).  If fishers were unavailable at the time of approach, 
alternative arrangements were made.  All interviews were conducted in May to June 2007 on an 
individual basis and took 30 to 45 minutes per interviewee.  Semi structured questionnaires were 
designed to gather qualitative and quantitative data on stakeholders’ perceptions about fishery decline 
in Utila.  Fishermen and key informants were also asked to identify the location of the marine reserve 
on grid 1:50,000 paper maps [19].  This allowed for cross validation of perspectives across the 
demographic groups and against key informants [20].  Finally, in order to help compile a history of the 
fishery [21], local fisher ‘experts’ were identified during the primary stakeholder interviews, through 
the frequency of fishers who recommended them. 
 
3.2 Data treatment and analysis 
 
Analysis was completed for all stakeholders collectively and fisher demographic groups separately, in 
order to explore stakeholder interrelations.  Semi structured questionnaires were largely composed of 
dichotomous variables and free response style questions.  These produced a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative data, coded to standardised categories at the point of entry into MS Excel.  To further 
explore stakeholder group variation, Principal Component Analysis (PCA) plots explored relationships 
between stakeholder responses to perceived fisheries threats and subsequent solutions, using PRIMER 
(Plymouth Routines in Multivariate Ecological Research) Version 6.1.2 [22].  In order to produce a 
more parsimonious model, variables were tested for statistical difference across the demographic 
groups using univariate Kruskall Wallis.  A cut off point of P<0.01 was established to remove variables 
with the lowest eigenvalues, leaving only those which exhibited highly significant differences between 
demographic groups [23].  The additional non significant variables were also examined using discourse 
analysis.  Finally, stakeholder group’s mutual perceptions of each other were deduced through the 
respondents’ answers concerning whom they worked/communicated with, using discourse analysis, in 
order to produce interactive networks.  
 
4.  Results 
 
4.1 Stakeholders’ perceptions of the existence of a fisheries decline 
 
Although an overwhelming proportion of stakeholders (between 70% and 93% of the respondents in 
their respective demographic groups) perceived that Utilian fish stocks had declined sharply in recent 
years (Table 1), the minority who took the opposite view were very confident in their optimism.  White 
Utilians were much more pessimistic than the other three groups.  The pessimists typically reported that 
every year fish were getting scarcer, fishing was getting harder, and that supplies of fish would run out 
within twenty years.  One fisher said that in 75 years of fishing he had never seen the stock so low. 
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Several fishers explained that they were having to resort to catching ‘trash’ fish, such as triggerfish and 
parrot fish, which until recently had not been targeted as they were of no commercial value.  42% of 
fishers claimed that they had to change their fishing grounds over the past 10 years, as a direct result of 
the fish stock decline (Table 1): one said that ten years ago he would fish just out of the harbour, but 
now he had to travel 45 to 50 miles offshore.  49% of fishers noted that it took them much longer than 
before to catch fish: one reported that now it took him 12 hours to catch what he caught in half an hour 
ten years ago.  Tellingly, in answer to the question of what occupation they would choose for their 
children, 75% of fishers did not recommend fishing (Table 1).  One replied, “I don’t want my son to go 
into fishing.  Anything [else] would be better”.  Another replied, “Not fishing.  This is a dog’s life”. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
On the other hand, the minority of optimists claimed that the fish stocks were not in danger.  One 
argued that there had been no change during the eight years that he had been fishing, and that “the sea 
is infinite”.  Optimists came disproportionately from the Latinos and Garifuna, one of whom declared 
that “They will last forever”.  Some fishers gave environmental reasons, one asserting that fish stock 
levels always fluctuated: “that is the way nature works”.  Another stated that because the fish were 
migratory, the stocks around Utila would never be fished out.  Yet another claimed that because “When 
they spawn, they make millions and millions of other fish, they’ll always be around”.  Many of the 
optimists also indicated that they “loved” fishing, and that they were happy for their children to follow 
in their footsteps.    
 
4.2 Stakeholders’ perceptions of the cause(s) of the decline 
 
Figure 2 is a PCA plot (PC1 39.8%; PC2 30.5%) representing perceived causes of the decline of the 
Utilian fishery.  Of those that perceived there to be a decline in the Utilian fishery, all demographic 
groups identified destructive fishing and overexploitation as drivers of the decline.  The ENGOs 
identified weak management; the FF environmental factors; both the fishers and the FF identified 
economic migration; and BICA and the DA identified destructive fishing and weak management.  
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Discourse analysis was use to identify frequency of perceived causes.  The most frequently identified 
source of decline in target fish stocks was overfishing or “overexploitation” – almost everyone, 
pessimists and optimists alike, perceived fishing effort to have reached unsustainable levels.  One fisher 
explained that whereas in the past, fishers typically fished a few times during the week, in good 
weather, and only during daylight, now they went out 365 days and nights of the year, regardless of 
weather conditions.  The second most frequently expressed threat to the fishery was immigration, 
particularly from the mainland of Honduras.  One fisher referred to it as “mass immigration”, though 
the problem was perceived not just as the numbers of immigrants, but the intensive way that they 
fished:  “They catch everything, the Spanish [Latinos], no loyalty…they don’t know the waters so they 
take everything”.  An ENGO worker added that immigrants “go into protected areas and don’t pay 
attention to any of the rules”. 
 
 The third most cited cause of perceived fisheries decline was destructive fishing methods.  Many 
fishers blamed the use of spear guns by divers for scaring fish away.  Others blamed fish pots (or traps) 
and gill nets, which were introduced several decades ago from abroad, because of their increased yield.  
One fisher explained that “Fish traps and nets…catch all of the fish…nothing is able to escape”.  
Moreover, if pots and nets were lost, or not hauled in because of bad weather, they continued to catch 
fish, which then died, a phenomenon know as ‘ghost fishing’.  Another fisher blamed technological 
advances in the fishing industry (‘technical creep’).  The fourth cause was the targeting of spawning 
fish, which, as one fisher put it, “meant that fish can’t reproduce”.  Most (72.4%) fishers admitted 
targeting spawning fish, even when they knew how damaging it was to the health of the stock. This was 
primarily because, they claimed, they needed the money.     
 
Tourism was the fifth cause of perceived fishery decline for two reasons.  First, according to an ENGO 
worker, it increased local demand for fish, which led to an increase in supply.  Second, tourism cut off 
alternative employment on the land: as one fisher explained: “we knew nothing of money, and they 
flashed hundreds of dollars at us, and it blew our minds, so we sold all our land, and relied only on 
fishing from then on”.  This links to the sixth cause, which was a lack of alternative livelihood options 
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available.  The seventh cause was large foreign trawlers, which fished offshore and depleted the 
migrating stocks before they reached Utilian waters.  One fisher claimed that Cuban boats came in 
2005 and 2006, targeting grouper and snapper, and there is heavy industrial fishing from Roatan and 
other Bay Islands.  Eighth, was pollution: for one fisher, the seawater around Utila had become 
polluted during the last ten years because of the effluence from the tourist industry, including “garbage, 
sewage and oil”.  For other fishers, the pollution came from “red tides” which “killed all the reef fish”.  
The final cause of perceived fishery decline was poaching by fishers from La Ceiba on the Honduran 
mainland, who came over at night and used traps to “steal our lobster and fish” one fisher claimed.   
 
4.3 Stakeholders’ perceptions of past management measures to deal with the decline 
The main management measure was the marine reserve at Turtle Harbour, awareness of which varied 
across demographic groups (Figure 3).   
 
 [Insert Figure 3]  
 
Whilst all key stakeholder groups had some knowledge of Turtle Harbour reserve and its location, 
awareness of it was highest amongst White Cayans, followed by White Utilians.  Awareness was lower 
for Latinos and lowest for Garifunas (Table 2).  There was less difference across demographic groups 
in understanding the protected area’s purposes: in every group, less than a quarter of interviewees 
attributed its aims to fisheries, most believing it was established for tourists.  With regard to 
enforcement of the reserve’s regulations, many fishers claimed that the two guards who patrolled the 
reserve only worked part time, and overlooked poaching activities.  One fisher alleged that “The 
watchmen…let their friends and families fish there.  One even used to bring their own divers”.  
Another claimed that a guard “doesn’t go out every day; has to fish for [a] living too; [and] when [he] 
does catch people, the law doesn’t care.  The Spanish still go out there and catch as much as they can”.  
In any case, said another fisher, the protected area was too small and shallow, and contained 
“nothing…to protect”.  A fisher referred derogatively to another protected area; the closure of the 
snapper banks in 2003, as a result of which the fish recovered well.  But when in 2005 the restrictions 
were lifted, the stock “was quickly fished down again”.   
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
4.4 Stakeholders’ perceptions of future management measures needed to deal with perceived 
fisheries decline  
 
Some stakeholders were fatalistic, and felt there were no solutions to the fishery decline.  For instance, 
in answer to the question of what can be done to bring the fish back, one fisher replied, “Nothing, don’t 
think they can”.  Most, however, offered suggestions, which followed on from their perceptions of the 
causes of the problem.  
 
Many called for gear restrictions; as one fisher put bluntly: “stop the fish murder by banning all gill 
nets and fish traps”.  Others demanded that spear gun fishing be banned.  Many argued that the only 
sustainable form of fishing was hand lining.  Another proposal was effort control, by quota restrictions, 
and closed seasons, to protect spawning stocks in particular, and a ban on large foreign offshore boats.  
Coupled with these suggestions, was a proposal to provide compensation to fishers for consequent loss 
of fishing opportunities, and, more importantly, to ensure jobs for displaced fishers.  With regard to 
area closures, White Utilians had a higher perception of future benefits from protected sites than did all 
other groups.  Perceived compliance with marine reserve regulations was different across fisher groups: 
most Latinos and Garifunas predicted compliance, but only 35.7% White Utilians and 22% White 
Cayans forecast compliance (Table 3).  A PCA (52.3%, PC2 37%) (Figure 4) of perceived solutions 
highlighted that the main difference between stakeholders was that while all fishers’ groups prioritised 
closed seasons and the prevention of destructive fishing methods, the DA, municipality and NGOs 
prioritised participatory engagement and education, while BICA and the FF prioritised legislation and a 
halt to economic migration.  
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
[Table 3] 
 
4.5 Stakeholders’ perceptions of management structures in relation to perceived fisheries decline 
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The majority of fishers reported their virtual exclusion from fisheries management – though 22% of 
White Utilians perceived themselves to be involved (Table 4).  Moreover, a majority of fishers 
lamented that there was so little participation in fisheries management decision making (Table 4), 
though White Utilians and White Cayans were more pessimistic than were Latinos and Garifunas about 
the prospects of participation working.  Typical complaints were that “We are not included”; “they 
never bother to ask our opinions on anything”; and “it is the tourists which make the decisions round 
here”.  Another finding was that stakeholders generally perceived the management system to be weak 
and ineffectual, lacking authority and weight.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
4.6 Stakeholders’ perceptions of other stakeholders in light of perceived fisheries decline  
 
In discourse analysis, an important way of understanding what lies behind the stances taken by 
stakeholders on issues such as fisheries, is to examine their perceptions of other stakeholders.  One 
method of showing mutual perceptions is by interactive networks (Figure 5).  What is significant here 
is the stratification between the fishers’ groups: whereas White Utilian and White Cayan fishers 
interact quite widely with each other and with other segments of Utilian society, the Latino and 
Garifuna fishers are largely confined to their relationship with the fish factory (FF).  BICA was the sole 
connection between fishers and authorities, dealing firstly with White Utilians and secondly with White 
Cayans, but BICA itself had weak connections with the municipality and the other NGO.  For its part, 
the Municipality had strong interactions with the DA, which had robust ties with the other NGO. 
 
[Insert Figure 5] 
 
Examining comments made by one group about another constitutes another method of showing mutual 
perceptions.  The most frequently expressed comment was disparagement of Latinos and Garifunas by 
White Utilians and by White Cayans.  For instance, one White Utilian stated, “Mainlanders…are like 
locusts”.  Another White Utilian alleged that “the Spanish…take the Utilians’ culture and language 
away”.  A White Cayan claimed that Mainlanders “came and never left.  They built their houses and 
they breed like rats”.  Another White Cayan complained, “Most of the [fish] slaughter comes from the 
Mainlanders.  We need to tackle them; they are destroying everything”.  Also, White Utilians made 
negative comments about resident Cayan fishers.  For instance, White Utilians complained that the 
Cayans were “greedy” and “headstrong”, and that “They are taking all our work and they are bringing 
drugs and thievery to the island”.  Another declared that “the mentality of the Cayans has not ever 
expanded.  The Mainlanders [Latinos and Garifunas] and the Cayans are idiots…They don’t see a 
problem; only see for the next day.  Their brains are dead”.  So there are two important faultlines of 
social stratification in Utila: the first between White Utilians and White Cayans on the one hand, and 
Latinos and Garifuna on the other; and the second between White Utilians on the one hand, and all 
three other groups on the other.  
 
There was also great hostility expressed by fishers towards tourists, for four reasons.  First, as we have 
seen in Section 4.2, some fishers perceived that wealthy tourists had bought up their land at cheap 
prices.  Second, fishers complained that tourist divers restricted their tuna fishing opportunities.  For 
instance, a fisher explained that the dive boats followed the tuna fishers because the presence of bonito 
tuna indicated the presence of the whale sharks, which the divers wanted to view.  But this meant that 
fishers could not fish there because their hooks and lines could endanger the divers.  So the fishers had 
either to go to less productive areas, or waste time and fuel waiting until the divers left.  Third, fishers 
stated that tourists frightened off the fish when they went diving: “Now the fish and the sharks run 
when they hear the engines – they are scared of us now”.  Fourth, fishers resented the fact that, as most 
of them saw it, the Turtle Harbour marine reserve was established for the benefit of tourists, not fishers.  
One fisher claimed it was set up so that “tourists…can go out and take pictures.  It is very unfair”.  
Another remarked, ironically, that “we get locked up by just looking at the area…we can’t even take 
our family there on a day out.  If we even get caught [being] there, we get fined”. 
 
5.  Discussion 
 
The results revealed to us a deep seated malaise in the Utilian fishery.  This is not because we 
necessarily took the stakeholders’ perceptions at face value.  Indeed, as discourse analysts, we are not 
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primarily interested in the ‘validity’, ‘accuracy’ or ‘truth’ of the statements made by stakeholders in 
their interviews.  Instead, we focus on what those statements tell us of the stakeholders’ states of mind; 
especially their sense of empowerment/powerlessness and feeling of positively/hopelessness.  We are 
also interested in what the statements reveal about the quality of the relationships between stakeholders 
and between stakeholder groups.  It is these psychological and social factors, which will indicate what 
kind of fisheries governance regime in Utila is feasible for the future.  Studying these states of mind 
and social relationships as expressed in the interview transcripts has led us to the conclusion that there 
are two alternative modes of fisheries governance that could be adopted by the Utilians to deal with the 
malaise: voluntary authoritarianism; or community co governance.   
 
5.1 Modes of governance in Utila 
 
In Section 2.2, we distinguished between three modes of governance: hierarchical; market; and 
participative.  If we apply this analysis to Utila, we find that its mode of fisheries governance for the 
last 20 years has been closest to the market mode.  As an Utilian ENGO worker asserted, somewhat 
critically, “The economic groups hold the power…they are the ones which make the decisions, but 
there is very little bearing on the long term.  It has a tendency to be short term…Here money talks, no 
one can see the long term gain, they can’t see further than six months”.  The main economic driver 
until recently was the fish processing factory established in the late 1980s, followed by another in the 
1990s.  According to fishers’ statements, the first factory initially saved the fishers from economic 
insecurity by offering to buy all the fish they could catch: “this was a salvation for the community.  
Without her we would have starved [because] we had no other trade at that time”.  However, many 
fishers argue that the fish processing plant’s very success contributed to the fishery decline in Utila, 
because it led to gross overfishing of the stocks.  They claimed that it was responsible for the wave of 
immigration from the mainland, because mainlanders could be paid less than islanders; and it caused 
destructive fishing by supplying fish traps and nets to fishers.  One fisher tellingly remarked that the 
factory “defines what we catch”, in that it opened up new markets for fish, such as sharks: “As a result 
now, there are no sharks”.  This market mode of governance bred a spirit of competitiveness amongst 
fishers, stimulating them to follow each other in adopting harmful fishing methods, reinforcing 
destructive Malthusian overfishing [6].  One fisher claimed that “The problem is that if we don’t catch 
things, then the Spanish [Latinos] will.  That’s why we have all started using nets and traps”.    
 
During the last few years, tourism has overtaken fishing as the main economic driver, but this has only 
compounded the damaged fisheries stocks, according to fishers, and accelerated the harm inflicted on 
the marine environment, according to the ENGOs.  Tourists in general increased the demand for locally 
caught fish, thereby adding to the pressure on stocks, while dive tourists in particular damaged the coral 
reef and thereby fisheries habitats.  Fishers claimed that “it is the tourists which make the decisions 
round here”, and that “it is tourism that controls the law”.  It seems, therefore, that the fishers perceive 
the largely unregulated market mode of fisheries governance to have been tried and failed in Utila.  
 
There has been some trace of the hierarchical mode of governance existing in Utila, in the mayoral 
office and BICA. The Mayor claimed, “The municipality are the decision makers…We have advisors 
in the form of the dive shop association and BICA”.  Evidence of the exercise of hierarchical authority 
includes the regulations that were prescribed by the municipality for the protection of the marine 
reserve at Turtle Harbour, and enforced by the Mayor’s office in the form of a part time fisheries patrol 
officer and the DA.  However, as we have seen from fishers’ interviews, it was clear that these 
regulations were frequently violated.  One fisher explained, “It’s a status thing.  Makes the boys think 
they’re tough”.  Other fishers were apparently unaware of the regulations.  The weakness of the 
Mayor’s authority in the eyes of stakeholders was also revealed by an ENGO worker who referred to 
the Mayor’s unilateral declaration of Utila’s inshore area as a marine reserve, only to modify it after 
protests by Cayans: “the legislation was changed to not include the Cayans as they only fish for a living 
and we didn’t want to cut off their living”.  Many fishers made disparaging remarks about the mayoral 
system, including “Don’t trust them.  They give us token gestures but don’t really care”; “lack of 
laws”; and “They have no authority around here… [we] need real authority, but we have none”.  One 
fisher complained that when destructive gear was beginning to appear, the municipality did not act: 
“Nobody wanted to put fines on them for using these.  There was no one to defend us”.  Clearly, then, 
many stakeholders had very little confidence in the existing hierarchical elements of fisheries 
governance in Utila.   
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The third mode of fisheries governance – the participatory mode – has not been tried in Utila, though 
the Mayor claimed that on the Cays, there was in existence a form of community self governance: 
“There is a patronato on the Cays.  This helps people manage their own reefs”.  However, according to 
fishers, there have been only abortive attempts to form patronatos: “we had one before, but we all fell 
out.  Nobody trusted each other”.  The perception of fishers was that there was little or no stakeholder 
participation in fisheries governance: “People fish for themselves”. 2    
 
5.2 Voluntary authoritarianism  
 
From our analysis of the interview transcripts, we believe that the only way to avert a collapse of fish 
stocks around Utila, is to establish a governance system which is based either on rational choice 
(voluntary authoritarianism) or on moral consensus (community co management).  We found evidence 
from the fishers’ interviews to suggest that they would support a regime of voluntary authoritarianism.  
First, among fishers there was a widespread feeling across all the groups that destructive fishing and 
overexploitation was a contributory factor to the fishing decline.  They believed that what they were 
doing to the fish was self defeating, but felt themselves locked into a competitive economic system not 
of their own making.  For example, many fishers admitted that they targeted spawning fish while 
knowing that it would eventually destroy the stocks.  One said, “so much money is to be made from 
this that you’ve got to fish them, even though it’s wrong”.  Another, after indicating how lucrative the 
fishing of spawning stock was, affirmed, “we do need to stop fishing them…we need to start to look 
into the future, need to look out for our grandsons”.  Similar sentiments were expressed about other 
harmful fishing practices, such as illicit fishing in protected areas, “everyone needs to stop fishing for a 
while to let the fish come back.  But people would lose a lot”, and destructive fishing mechanisms, “I 
use them, but I know they are bad.  It’s the way to make the best money, and if I stop then others will 
still use it”.  
 
This suggests that Utilians from all demographic backgrounds were fully aware that drastic steps 
needed to be taken to combat the current destructive fishing trends, but pessimistic about their own 
ability to individually take such steps.  For instance, one fisher declared that “The nets and the traps 
need to be banned.  The community need to do this, but this is very hard”.  Another, after suggesting 
“resting time for the fish – seasons for them”, commented that “this would not be good for the 
fishermen, but they know that it is needed but they just can’t do it without help”.  If the political will 
necessary to do it were to be exhibited by a powerful authority, the likelihood is that Utilians would 
consent to that authority.  There was a yearning for decisive action, expressed in somewhat apocalyptic 
language by non fishers: “If they don’t do something now, the stocks will collapse” (ENGO worker).  
The President of the DA recommended coercion: “Shoot everyone who fishes!  We could use the navy 
to protect the spawning aggregation”.  Similarly strong language was employed by some fishers: “we 
need a law here that would hang people if they broke the law”.  Strong government would also need to 
tackle the current levels of uncontrolled immigration, which threatened both fishing and non–fishing 
jobs of indigent workers.  As was outlined in Section 4.4, many indigent fishers were happy to stop 
fishing if they could obtain alternative employment 
 
Second, the high levels of group animosity and demographic segregation indicate that the Utilians were 
not yet collectively ready to take these drastic decisions for themselves.  One fisher said that, ideally, 
fishers needed to form an association, but that “to get everyone together will be very hard”.  Another 
argued “It should be the responsibility of BICA and the municipality to bring the fish back”.  In other 
words, in the short term, Utilians need a paternalistic authority.  
 
Third, the existing political regime of representative government was too weak to deliver the necessary 
action to safeguard the fish stocks.  As we saw earlier, in Section 4.5, stakeholders’ perceptions of past 
management measures to deal with the decline were generally negative, and fisheries governance was 
regarded as unfit for purpose.  The main policy was the much vaunted marine reserve at Turtle 
Harbour, which few respondents believed was effective.  Several interviewees criticised the current 
                                                 
2
 Fishing co-operatives or folk management systems were common in neighbouring Belize for over 50 
years, working successfully until the combined impacts of globalisation, tourism, corruption and mis-
management undermined their effectiveness [24]. 
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political authority for its supineness.  One fisher said that “The Mayor…is worthless: there is no law on 
this island. Years ago there was a season for the lobster, now nobody bothers to enforce it.  If we had a 
law that the Mayor would put teeth behind, it would help”.  Another complained that “We have gone to 
the Mayor again and again about this, and they keep saying that they will do something…but nothing 
ever happens…they don’t give us any law round here, nothing…we keep telling the municipality to 
stop the pots and the nets…but we are aren’t listened to”.  Nor was BICA perceived to have any 
authority, according to another fisher: “BICA hired guards [for the protection area], and have no 
authority.  Even if the guards do report someone, they do nothing about it, they don’t really care”.     
 
Accordingly, what comes out of the interviews is the need for a strong form of governance with 
authority given to it from stakeholders to enforce drastic measures to protect the fish stocks from 
imminent collapse – voluntary authoritarianism.  However, this is only one of two alternative modes of 
fisheries governance that seem to be endorsed by stakeholders’ discourses.  The other mode is 
community co governance, to which we now turn.  
 
5.3 Community co management       
 
From our analysis of the interview transcripts, we found support for an alternative mode of fisheries 
governance in order to provide effective sustainable fisheries management; community co management.  
It is clear from the fishers’ interviews that at least some Utilians aspired to such a participative 
community mode of fisheries management.  For instance, one fisher insisted, “The fishermen have to 
do this themselves.  We cannot rely on anyone else…the law will never work.  People will find 
themselves a way around the system.  It has to be based on an agreement between the fishermen 
themselves”.  Another fisher declared  “We need to get together and form a co op and put down our 
own rules and our own fines…We need to get the community working together…the rest of the 
community need to decide to pressure those who won’t listen”.  In other words, there was a strong 
feeling expressed by fishers (particularly amongst White Utilians and White Cayans) that they 
themselves should assume responsibility for fisheries decision making.    
 
Some of the key informants also perceived community responsibility to be the most suitable option. For 
example, an ENGO worker argued that what was needed was a shift in mindset from a blame culture to 
a responsibility culture: “The fishermen believe you can fish, fish, fish and then blame it on other 
people.  Fishers must realise and become directly responsible for the drop in the fisheries…They need 
to get a sense of ownership of the reef instilled in them…In particular, to protect the spawning sites…It 
is up to the local community to stand up and look after their resources.  They don’t need a fisheries 
inspector, the fishermen just need to care about it”. 
 
However, the malaise that was found to exist between demographic groups at the time of study, made a 
system of community co management seem impracticable in the immediate future.  The negative 
perceptions of some stakeholder groups about others revealed deep social stratification.  For instance, a 
White Utilian fisher claimed that there was a fundamental divergence in the mindsets of Utilians and 
Cayans: “The Utilians and the Cayans are different…Utilians can sit down and talk and discuss and 
work together.  That is why we don’t use the nets and the pots.  We are able to reason with each other.  
The Cayans don’t want to discuss it.  That’s why we are separate.  That’s why we can never work 
together.  They need…to be forced together”.  The Mayor claimed that “there isn’t any common 
ground between the people of Utila and The Cays”.  As a result, the existing participative avenues were 
highly selective and reserved for the demographic groups of higher social strata.  Accordingly, it is 
likely that local elite groups would retain privileges and power in any immediate form of community co 
management, and not share the benefits of resource use equitably [25] [26].  This may be why White 
Utilians and White Cayans were much more critical than Latinos and Garifunas were about the lack of 
stakeholder participation in fisheries governance.  Unless intercommunity stratification was addressed, 
as Jentoft [15] argued, a system of community co management runs the risk of entrenching existing 
conflicts and inequities [26], victimising weaker stakeholders.  So economic rivalry and mutual 
recrimination appeared to preclude a prompt transition to a community co management system.  
Coercion rather than dialogue is the only short term solution.  One fisher bluntly declared that fisher’s 
participation in management “just wouldn’t work here…We need enforcement, we need to put people 
in jail for breaking the rules, we need to threaten to hang them”.  An ENGO worker claimed that “this 
is a dog eat dog island, everyone is only out for themselves”. 
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Ideally, however, voluntary authoritarianism could pave the way for a transition to community co 
management.  A mechanism for such a transition would be if the authoritarian leadership (1) forged 
bridges between the groups by building a consensus over the causes of, and solutions to, the fishery 
decline, and instilled a sense of environmental stewardship among fishers; (2) encouraged the 
establishment of fishers’ organisations, devolving some powers of fisheries management to them; and 
(3) provided socio economic support, including alternative employment opportunities, to fishers who 
had to quit fishing. Based on this, the article advises caution with regards to allowing market forces to 
determine how fisheries are governed, and promotes the need for enforcing strict regulations on 
fisheries before contemplating a transition to a more participative mode of fisheries governance. Since 
the very act of facilitating dialogue, as stated earlier, is not always an appropriate way of achieving this 
when so much ‘malaise’ exists between fisher demographic groups 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, given the current mindset of Utilian fishers, voluntary authoritarianism is a more 
practicable mode of governance in the short term, in that it would supply the discipline necessary for an 
immediate response to the fisheries decline.  But community co-management is the more appropriate 
mode of governance in the long term, because only when the concept of environmental stewardship has 
been internalised by stakeholders, rather than externally imposed upon them, will a secure and 
sustainable future be obtained for the Utilian fishery.  Ideally, voluntary authoritarianism would pave 
the way for community co management, by providing a strict regulatory framework to secure fish 
stocks; by instilling a moral sense of environmental stewardship in fishers and other users of the sea; 
and by gradually introducing more stakeholder participation into fishery management decision making. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1:  A summary of primary stakeholder perceptions addressing the existence of a fisheries decline.  
The different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following categories: WU = White 
13 
 Fishers     
 %WU %WC %LC %GC % Total  
Further protection will be of help 29 50 30 0 42 
Fishers will comply 22 36 50 87 36 
 
 Fishers     
 %WU %WC %LC %GC % Total  
Are aware of protected area 88 100 60 25 75 
Believe it was established as a 
fisheries management strategy 
23 18 14 0    14 
 
Utilian fishers, WC = White Cayan fishers, LC = Latino Cayan fishers and GC = Garifuna Cayan 
fishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  A summary of primary stakeholder perceptions addressing past management measures to deal 
with the decline.  The different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following categories: 
WU = White Utilian fishers, WC = White Cayan fishers, LC = Latino Cayan fishers and GC = 
Garifuna Cayan fishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  A summary of primary stakeholder perceptions addressing their perception of future 
management.  The different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following categories: 
WU = White Utilian fishers, WC = White Cayan fishers, LC = Latino Cayan fishers and GC = 
Garifuna Cayan fishers. 
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Table 4:  A summary of primary stakeholder perceptions addressing the management structures in 
relation to the decline.  The different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following 
categories: WU = White Utilian fishers, WC = White Cayan fishers, LC = Latino Cayan fishers and GC 
= Garifuna Cayan fishers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure captions  
 
Figure 1:  Map of Utila, Honduras, identifying the two main fishing communities targeted for the 
purpose of this study. 
 
Figure 2:  Principal Components Analysis (PCL) plot (PC1 39.8%; PC2 30.5%) representing the 
current perceived causes of decline to the Utilian fishing industry, as identified by primary and key 
 Fishers     
 %WU %WC %LC %GC % Total  
Content with involvement? 14 42 40 50 29 
Involved in management?  4 22 9 0  8 
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stakeholders.  The different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following categories:  = 
White Cayan,  = Latino Cayan,  = Garifuna Cayan.  = White Utilian,  = Municipality,  = Fish 
Factory, = Bay Island Conservation Association,  = Dive Association, = ENGO 
 
Figure 3:  Map illustrating the actual and perceived location of the Turtle Harbour Reserve by the key 
stakeholders and the different demographic fisher primary stakeholders.  
 
Figure 4:  Principal Components Analysis (PCL) plot (PC1 52.3%, PC2 37%) representing the current 
perceived solutions to the Utilian fishing industry, as identified by primary and key stakeholders.  The 
different stakeholder groups have been subdivided into the following categories:  = White Cayan,  
= Latino Cayan,  = Garifuna Cayan.  = White Utilian,  = Municipality,  = Fish Factory, = 
Bay Island Conservation Association,  = Dive Association, = ENGO 
 
Figure 5:  Stakeholder interaction network between Utilian primary and key stakeholder groups, 
illustrating mutual perceptions of communication strength and direction, based upon interview answers. 
Thickness of the arrows represents perceived strength of interactions. 
